Ponente
Didier Aussel
(Universidad de Perpignan)
Descripción
Single-Leader-Multi-Follower games are Stackelberg games
where several followers compete in a non cooperative way. These complex Optimisation problems recently attracted a lot of attention since many hierarchical models of real life situations lead to such structures. Nevertheless the classical (quasi-)convexity assumptions which are usually made to solve these problems fails for many applications
while the involved functions (objectives and constraints) are very often
polynomial. Thus our aim is here is to explore to what extend modern polynomial optimisation can be used in the context of polynomial Single-Leader-Follower games.
Keywords: polynomial single leader follower game, quasiconvex problems, properties.
Autores primarios
Didier Aussel
(Universidad de Perpignan)
G Li
(University of New South Whales)
V Jeyakumar
(University of New South Whales)
